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PREFACE 
Philosophers, academicians, theologists, and politicians have, 
since the origins of man and the creation of their disciplines, proposed 
insights explaining human interaction. At times, these explanations 
have themselves become the justification, or excuse, for the ways in 
which men confront themselves and each other. 
This paper is based on the premise that all humans feel the need 
to fulfill certain basic desires, among them: the security of the 
individual, the safety of the family, and the establishment of a social 
environment in which both can develop. These needs transcend political, 
economic, :and religious ideology. 
When groups of individuals interact, these desires are magnified 
to a societal level-- some call them national aspirations. Economic or 
physical prosperity and national defence know no philosophy or ideology, 
when it is realized that such beliefs are only the intellectual means 
to fulfill more personal, eternal goals. 
Sincere appreciation is felt for the Oklahoma State University 
Political Science Department for the time and support it has given to my 
personal development. Special gratitude is felt for Harold Sare, who much 
more than lent valuable time for this thesis, has given me special in-
sights into a lifetime pursuit. Raymond Habiby has always been most 
instructive, and kind: I especially thank him for ~any hours of stimu-
lating conversation and friendship. And finally, I would like to thank 
James Lawler for the time and input he gave to this project. I can only 
iiii 
hope that one day I wi 11 have the right to ca 11 these fine gentlemen, 
11 Colleagues. 11 
The greatest appreciation, however, is felt for my family. 
Dolores and Richard Klausmeyer have given a lifetime of complete, loving 
support-- the highest tribute I can pay is to attempt to be as good a 
parent. And my wife, Barbarastephanie Arter, has, and I am sure will 
always, give me her deepest support. I will do only the same for her. 
July 5, 1984 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the year 416 B.C., the Athenians sent a naval expedition against 
the Island of Melos in what is known today as the Aegean Sea. Under 
the generalship of Alchibiades, a young man hoping that military conquest 
would bring him fame and fortune, the Athenians arrived at the island 
prepared to attack. Instead of pressing on with the sacking of Melos, 
the Athenians entered into negotiations with the islanders; in exchange 
for tribute to be paid to the -Athenians, the Melians were to be left 
in peace. 
These negotiations were recorded, as he imagined they occurred, by 
the Greek chronicler Thucydides, in what has become known as the ''Melian 
Dialogue." 1 Thucydides portrays the Athenians as declaring "might makes 
right," and that the Melians should defer to Athenian demands since gods 
had shown their preference by making the Athenians the stronger of the 
two. The Melians, besides placing their hope for survival on good fortune 
in battle against their superior opponent, kept faith in the fact that 
they were colonists of the Lacedaemonian Empire. As the Melians related 
to the Athenians, an attack against Melos would lead to a wider war by 
bringing Lacedaemonia into the fight and also have the repercussion of 
fostering distrust for Athens on the part of neutrals. Eventually the 
negotiations failed, and after a seige of several months the Lacedaemonian 
colony of Melos fell to the Athenians; all Melian adult males were put 
to death, and all women and children were bound over into slavery. 
1 
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While the fate of Melos is an interesting tale to ancient historians, 
Thucydides' 11 Melian Dialogue 11 is of particular interest to the diplomatic 
historian and the political scientist. The Dialogue describes an early 
example of the interaction between two societal actors possessing 
political, military, and economic power. The stronger of the two, the 
Greek city-state of Athens, sought conquest and national interest (with 
some Athenians seeking personal gain) through the force of arms. The 
weaker colony, Melos, refused to submit, placing faith in fate and its 
relationship with a 11 parent 11 state. 
Of course, Thucydides recorded his History of the Peloponnesian War 
and the story of Melos very much in the style of Homer; a description 
of events providing entertainment for the listener or reader and, most 
importantly, relating some moral lesson for future generations. While 
an understanding of the sequence of events is necessary to understanding 
a social relationship, today's scholar seeks facts in a much more 
methodical manner with the intent, among other things, to draw better 
generalizations about social interaction. This study will examine the 
strong state-weak state relationship by employing a more rigorous method-
ology than merely rendering a chronological survey. 
At this point it should be noted that when referring to states of 
unequal power, the terms strong, stronger, weak, and weaker will be used. 
Often times the terms large, larger, small, and smaller are employed, 
with, it must be admitted, a loss in accuracy when a wide variety of 
factors are taken into consideration. The Peoples Republic of China 
and the Republic of India are both larger in terms of population than 
any other countries in the world today, but would it be fair to say that 
they are stronger than the United States, the Soviet Union, France, 
Britain, or Japan? In terms of size in land mass, the Commonwealth of 
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Australia is larger than Japan, West Germany, and Great Britain. But 
once again, can it be said that Australia is stronger? When referring 
to such factors as economic, military, or diplomatic power, the terms 
strong and weak provide great accuracy, while maintaining the relational 
character (i.e., one state is stronger~ relation to another) when con-
sidering two or more countries. 
As illustrated by the "Melian Dialogue," the topic of imperialism 
is not a new subject of study. For many years and from many parts of 
the world, scholars and politicians have tried to explain the strong-weak 
state relationship by using several different factors. Some have sought 
to explain strong-weak state interaction in terms of political, ideolog-
ical, religious, and ethnic factors. All of these are important to the 
study of dependence, but do not lend themselves to easy comparative 
analysis. One of the key points of this thesis will be to attempt a 
systematic study of dependence. In order to do this, measurable phenomena 
have been selected to be analyzed. For this reason, the economic dimen-
sion of dependence will be emphasized. 
For many years writers have taken the economic approach to understand-
ing how stronger states interact with the weaker. The works of Karl Marx 
and V. I. Lenin, of course, become very important when considering the 
economic interpretations. Far from being the first communists, they 
did give socialist thought a more precise direction and firm method of 
analysis. The theories of Marx will provide a starting point to under-
standing the economic interpretations. Then the views of Lenin and other 
economic theorists, some having their origins in Marxist thought and 
some not, will be reviewed. It is important to understand the economic 
theories of strong-weak state relationships because much of the 
terminology used by those who emphasize economic factors is used by those 
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who concentrate on other factors of such interaction. While many of 
these economic theories have generated considerable controversy because 
some states have adopted them as the heart of their political dogma, 
scholarly study demands that they be taken into consideration. The object 
of this study is to examine social theory, and such theory will not be 
rejected because of the political sensitivities of any person. 
While full explanations of the economic terms will have to wait for 
the chapter on Methodology, the hypotheses are elaborated below. It 
must be pointed out that as one studies these hypotheses, different types 
of economic dependence are sometimes being described. If more than twenty 
percent of a state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in the form of foreign 
trade, then at least the monetized sector of that state's economy is 
dependent upon foreign trade. 2 This hypothesis does not seek to explain 
state-to-state relationships, but is. used to describe a type of dependence 
internal to a state--the health of a country's economy being dependent 
on its exports, regardless of the importers. Also important to the study 
of a country's dependence upon its export sector is an. examination of 
those products or services being exported, referred to as the degree 
of export concentration. Export concentration refers to the diversifi-
cation of the state's exports. While no formal hypothesis will be 
elaborated, export concentration should be investigated to provide a 
fuller analysis of a weak state's export dependence. After all, if a 
state is dependent upon the export of a scarce mineral, for which importers 
are plentiful, could it be compared to the situation of a state which 
is dependent upon the export of a common agricultural product? 
After the impact of foreign trade on a state's economy is investigated, 
the relations between the export dependent state and stronger importing 
countries must be examined. Proposed will be a test for exclusivity, or 
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the degree to which a weaker state exports to one stronger country. If 
more than one-third of a state's total foreign trade is with just one 
other country, then the weaker state is to be considered dependent upon 
the stronger. 3 Also important to the examination of exclusivity will 
be an analysis of which products are exported to the stronger states. 
This is particularly important to the state lacking diversification. 
Of great importance to the study of trade exclusivity is that of trade 
asymmetry. Trade asymmetry is where trade between two countries is 
reflected in one receiving a larger portion of its GOP from the exchange 
of goods and services than the other. The greater the degree of asymmetry, 
the greater the possibility that one state is dependent upon another. 4 
Of course, foreign aid must also be included in this thesis on economic 
dependence. No hypothesis is given which explains solely the role of 
economic aid in dependence. Instead, foreign aid as a percentage of GOP 
will be added to the percentage of GOP earned from foreign trade. The 
analysis of dependence then will be made on this basis. This will give 
a more accurate picture of total economic dependence of one state upon 
another. 
The other major area of thought to be used in this study is centered 
upon security considerations. The security theorists either ignore the 
economic explanations of strong-weak state interaction, or else offer 
counter-arguments denouncing economic theory in an effort to give greater 
credence to the ideas they are advancing. Some scholars have focused 
on regional isolation as a factor relating to dependence. It is hypothe-
sized that the more regionally isolated the state, the more it will be 
dependent upon a stronger state to satisfy security concerns. 5 
After a brief study of the outstanding theoretical works on the sub-
ject. it will be necessary to choose case studies demonstrating the 
strong-weak state relationship. For this project, two examples will 
be used to increase the accuracy of the findings and enhance the possi-
bilities of discovering regularities in such relations .. Also, by using 
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at least two case studies, strong-weak state relationships can be examined 
across ideological lines; in this case, one from the capitalist and 
the other from the socialist 1spheres. Once again, this will lend in-
creased confidence in the results of this study. Pure state-to-state 
interaction, absent of ideological considerations, is the subject to 
be examined. For these purposes, the relationships of the United States 
and Israel, and the Soviet Union and Cuba will be employed as the case 
studies. 
This study, then, will contribute to the theoretical literature on 
the patron-client relationship and dependence in two ways. First, the 
strong state-weak state relationship will be examined across ideological 
systems in order to better refine theoretical generalization. The re-
lationship between the United States and Israel will be compared to that 
of the Soviet Union and Cuba. In particular, the common factors forcing 
Israel and Cuba, as representative weak states, to seek patrons (thus 
placing themselves in positions of dependence, a concept to be discussed 
in depth at a more appropriate time) will be sought. Secondly, this 
study will attempt to achieve a higher level of systematic inquiry by 
examining a series of factors relating to a feeling of insecurity and 
vulnerability on the part of weak states. If common sources of weakness 
can be proven to exist, not only within weak states themselves but also 
within states which follow different and, indeed, opposing ideologies, 
then higher level theoretical generalizations can be made with confidence. 
At the same time, a set of assumptions will be advanced which will lay 
the basis for future studies on the question of dependence. 
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This study will conclude by reviewing the factors leading to depen-
dence as discovered from analyzing the positions of Cuba and Israel. Is 
it a fair assessment to say that Israel and Cuba are dependent upon other 
states? What has led to this dependence? Do the Israelis and Cubans 
feel this dependence? How can the theories already advanced by scholars 
concerned with strong-weak state interaction be used to explain relation-
ship between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. and Israel and the United States? 
It is hoped that the following study will contribute to the literature 
on strong state-weak state interaction on the contemporary scene, and 
lead to a greater understanding of international events in general. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I 
1. Botford and Robinson's, Hellenic History, MacMillan Publishing Co., 
Inc.: New York, pp.220-224. 
2. Marshall Singer, Weak States in !l World of Powers: The Dynamics of 
International Relations, The.Free Press: New York, 1972, 
p.238. 
3. Ibid., p.238. 
4. Ibid., p.239. 
5. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, Frank 
Case and Co~td.: London~981, p.71. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM AND DEPENDENCE 
Economic Theories of Dependence 
Many subscribe to the notion that economics plays a key role in, if 
it is not at the heart of, societal interaction. There are a number of 
explanations that explain strong-weak state relations, imperialism, and 
dependence in economic terms. As already mentioned, the ideas of Karl 
Marx have had a profound influence on socialist thinkers from his time 
on. The theories of two European communists writing since the death of 
Marx are fundamental to this study. They are Rosa Luxumberg from Germany 
and Lenin of Russia. Also-of importance to a contemporary discussion 
of Marxist thought on imperialism and dependence is a group of writers 
collectively known as the depentistas. Their reasoning is Marxfst 
in origin, but does not use all of the features of Marx's writings. 
The depentistas make some adjustments to bring Marx's theories up-to-date 
and explain present reality with greater precision. Finally, the 
theories of Englishman John Hobson, not considered a Marxist but a 
liberal, are of interest since he offers an economic interpretation 
which is not Marxist in nature. 
It is common knowledge among students of society that the Marxist 
critique of economics was designed to explain capitalist relations of 
production and their affects on society. Marx criticized capitalism 
because of the constant expansion of surplus value (that product produced 
9 
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which does not go directly into reproducing the laborer), the alienation 
of the laborer from the fruits of his own production, and the resultant 
class conflicts. Marx's theory of imperialism and dependence criticized 
the capitalist states at that time on the grounds that within the 
strong-weak state relationship the capitalists exploit the weak 
countries of the world. 
According to Marx, three historical phases have passed which ex-
plain the relations between the developed or developing capitalist 
states and the undeveloped areas of the world. The first two were 
periods of exploitation in which wealth was directly taken out of these 
undeveloped regions and transferred to the capitalist centers: the 
first was that of plunder, and the second of trade and taxes. During 
the third stage, the capitalist states industrialized the undeveloped 
lands with capital flowing from the rich areas to the poor. 
The colonial system during the plunder stage was attempting to 
gain the wealth necessary for the take-off of the industrial revolution 
in Europe. According to Marx: 
The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting 
enslavement, and murder floated back to the mother country and 
were turned into capital.! 
During the whole course of the 18th century the treasures trans-
ported from India to England were gained much less by comparatively 
insignificant commerce, than by the direct exploitation of th~t 
country, and by the colossal fortunes transmitted to England. 
During the second phase, as Marx reconstructs the past, the in-
dustrialized nations of the world were expanding their manufacturing 
output, and the underdeveloped areas provided markets to absorb the 
products of that increasing output. Using colonial India as an 
example, Marx said of England: 
Until 1813 India had been chiefly an exporting country, while it 
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now became an importing one .... India, the great workshop of cotton 
manufacture ... became now inundated with English twist and cotton 
stuffs. After its own produce had been excluded from England, or 
only admitted on the most crucial terms, British manufactures were 
poured into it at a small and merely nomial duty, to the ruin of 
the native cotton fabrics once so celebrated.3 
Marx argues that it was this second phase of capitalist imperialism that 
disrupted the domestic economic and social fabric of the dominated 
countries, such as India. Traditional economic endeavors were ruined 
because of the flood of European imports, and far greater wealth was 
transferred to the industrialized states than was put back into the 
undeveloped areas. 
The third phase of exploitation described by Marx was one in which 
the capitalists of the developed countries transferred capital to the 
undeveloped, with the goal of creating wealth in the latter to trade 
for goods in the former. "You cannot continue to inundate a country 
with your manufactures," Marx wrote, "unless you enable it to give you 
some produce in return. The industrial interests found that their trade 
declined instead of increasing (as their industries became more pro-
ductive)."4 At this point, Marx said, the undeveloped nations took on 
the capitalist mode of production due to the influx of capital and 
capitalist methods from the developed countries of Europe. 
Rosa Luxumberg, a leading German Marxist during the early twentieth // 
century, argued that the only way capitalist accumulation could continue 
in the developed nations was through overseas expansion. Luxumberg saw 
imperialism as the only way the accumulation of wealth could continue 
in the developed areas of the world. New markets had tQ ___ b_e ___ o_pened, and 
- ----
new purchasers, previously outside of the relations of exchange already 
created, had to be introduced. Of particular interest here, however, 
is what Luxumberg had to say about the role of the state apparatus in 
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European imperialism. 
The part played by the governments of the European capitalist states 
was one of facilitating the economic expansion of their countries. 
Luxumberg believed that the state's role is one of opening new "spheres 
of interest'' in which markets are opened and new capital is transferred, 
both of which increase the amount of surplus value returning to the in-
dustrialized countries of Europe. 5 In particular, she said: 
Militarism ... is employed to subject the modern colonies, to destroy 
the social organizations of primitive societies so that their means 
of production may be appropriated, forcibly to introduce commodity 
trade in countries where the social structure had been unfavorable 
to it, and to turn the natives into a proletariat by compelling 
them to work for wages in the colonies. It is responsible for the 
creation and expansion of spheres of interest for European capital 
in non-European regions, for extorting railway concessions in back-
ward countries, and for gnforcing the claims of European capital 
as international lender. 
The result of this expansionist policy would be interimperialist wars, 
with the developed countries of Europe taking a bellicose posture against 
the undeveloped regions and also against the other capitalist states as 
they scramble for new and increasingly scarce areas in which to invest 
accumulated surplus value. 
Switching from the Marxist theorjsts to a non-Marxist, John Hobson 
believed that the European imperialism of the late nineteenth century 
could be linked to the trusts and monopolies that were growing at the 
time. Small capital investors could find plenty of opportunities within 
their domestic economies, but large investors of capital had to look 
for new investment possibilities abroad. It was within this framework 
that Hobson identified certain sectors as benefiting and having the 
keenist interests in imperialism abroad. Those sectors were manu-
facturers of armaments and railroad equipment, shipbuilders, large 
manufacturers primarily producing for export, those engaged in the 
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shipping trade, the military and civil servants who secure jobs adminis-
tering the colonies, professionals who identify with imperialism for 
ideological reasons, and most of all, the financial capitalists who 
put together and profit most from the trusts and combines. As Hobson 
wrote, 11 Aggressive Imperialism ... is a great source of gain to the 
investor who cannot find at home the profitable use he seeks for his 
capital, and insists that his Government should help him to profitable 
and secure investments abroad." 7 
V. I. Lenin would come to accept Marx•s and Hobson•s analysis of 
the causes of imperialism, and in his work Imperialism: The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism, expanded Hobson•s study of finance capital as the 
root source of capitalist expansion and imperialism. 8 Lenin believed 
that during the early years of the twentieth century, "monopolist 
associates of capitalists 11 had developed in all "capitalistically 
developed countries" and that in a certain 11 few very rich countries ... 
the accumulation of capital (had) reached gigantic proportions. 119 
Lenin, borrowing heavily from Hobson, surmized that the only outlet 
for the capital of these most advanced states was abroad. Secondly, 
Lenin believed that imperialist objectives were pursued by the capi-
talist states so as to secure scarce resources necessary for 
industrialization. 
Lenin described the role played by the state in this economically 
motivated expansion. Believing that the giant monopolies of Europe 
required new, non-monopolized areas in which to invest their huge sums 
of capital (in particular the banking trusts with their finance capital) 
and in which to extract the minerals needed for industrial production, 
the state apparatuses and their respective militaries stepped in to 
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secure new colonies. Lenin outlined several types of areas the European 
states exploited: formal colonies falling under the direct rule of 
a colonial master, semicolonies which had "independence" but little true 
autonomy, commercial colonies with a bourgeoisie dependent upon the fi-
nancial capital of the European capitalist centers, and independent 
protectorates which exercise a large amount of independence but have 
granted favorable economic concessions in their own countries and col-
onies to the finance capitalists in turn for their patronage and 
protection. Two main social groups, states and colonies, participated 
in the imperialist scheme, with a host of other politically independent 
territories around the world being "enmeshed in the net on financial 
and political dependence." 10 And finally, answering what is perhaps 
the key question, Lenin states: 
... what is the cardinal, underlying idea of our theses? The 
distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations ...• The 
characteristic feature of imperialism in the division of the 
whole world, as we now see, into a large number of oppressed 
nations by an insignificant number of oppressor nations 
which, however, command colossal wealth and powerful armed 
forces." 
In sum then, these older economic theorists of imperialism have 
several beliefs in common, and to a point build on each other. Ob-
viously, all saw imperialism as a manifestation of the capitalist mode 
of production of Europe, and later the United States. The capitalists 
required extraterritorial markets to absorb new production and lands to 
exploit so as to gain the materials necessary to expand surplus value. 
Following the lead of Marx, Luxumberg and Lenin agree on the idea that 
the governments of the capitalist states of Europe facilitate the mode 
of production by acquiring the colonies necessary to absorb that pro-
duction and supply those materials. While Marx dealt more with what was 
happening between the developed and underdeveloped states on a purely 
economic basis, both Lenin and Luxumberg agree that the respective 
militaries of the capitalist states also played a part in opening those 
new markets and regions for exploitation. 
As for those with the greatest interest in pursuing a policy of 
imperialism, Hobson and Lenin have done the most to answer this ques-
tion. Both agree that the growing monopolies and joint stock companies 
(one of the most famous examples being the East India Company of Great 
Britain) spurred on the imperialist policies of Europe. Hobson, of 
course, listed more sectors of European society and business as the 
cause of imperialism, with Lenin emphasizing the influence of the 
European banking community. 
Also, as all of these authors seem to agree in various degrees, 
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the undeveloped states become tied to the capitalistically developed 
states. The former come to rely on the latter for investment and the 
tools of economic modernization. While the object of the developed 
states was to use the undeveloped areas as markets and areas to supply 
needed raw materials, the undeveloped did experience various amounts of 
development as the European capitalists invested in those new markets. 
It is this last concept, that the less developed states did make some 
economic progress under this system of imperialism, which differentiates 
these classic economic theories from the depentistas. 
Latin American in origin and Marxist in much of their thinking, the 
depentistas attempt to use the same economic framework in searching for 
answers to the question of imperialism from the point of view of the 
underdeveloped countries. The overall thrust of the depentista train of 
thought is that the relations carried on between the capitalists of 
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Europe and the United States and the undeveloped areas of the world con-
tributed to the underdevelopment of the latter, an idea first advanced 
by the Communist International in 1928. Following, in order to get a 
feel for the beliefs of depentista thought, is an outline of the 
theories of Andre Gunder Frank, James A. Caporaso, and Carlos Johnson. 
Andre Gunder Frank is one of the foremost authors of the 
depentista tradition. He believes in the notion that the capitalist re-
lations between the capitalist centers and the undeveloped periphery 
lead to the underdevelopment of those already less developed countries. 
In his book Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Frank ad-
vances several hypotheses that attempt to explain this continuing 
underdevelopment. 12 The first of these states that "in contrast to the 
development of the world metropolis which is no one's satellite, the 
development of the national and other subordinate metropoles is limited 
by their satellite status." 13 As Frank admits, this is a difficult 
hypothesis to test, but seems to be proven by an examination of the un-
satisfactory and non-autonomous economic development of Latin America. 
Development in the cities of Beunos Aires and Sao Paulo is described as 
"a satellite development largely dependent on the outside metropolis, 
first Britain and then the United States."14 
The second hypothesis Frank advances states that the greatest 
economic expansion occurred when satellite status was at its weakest. 
This is tested by an examination of the period of the Second World War, 
in which the ties between the capitalist centers and the countries of 
Latin America were at their weakest. This is, in other words, a refuta-
tion of the belief that the greatest advances occur in the under-
developed world when there is a heavy infusion of capital from an 
outside source. Frank argues that his second hypothesis is also proven 
by an examination of the most isolated regions of the world, which he 
says showed promising signs of development which were arrested as these 
regions became integrated into the world capitalist system. 
Two other hypotheses put forward by Frank were crucial to the work 
of almost all depentistas. The first states that the latifundium 
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(large Latin American plantations) where initially created to respond to 
world demand by expanding land and labor to increase the supply of agri-
cultural products. The second, directly related to the former, states 
that "latifundia which appear isolated, subsistence based, and semi-
feudal today saw the demand for their products or their productive 
capability decline" 15 and that they are to be found in regions that saw 
a decline in the demand for their products in general. The important 
point here, explicitly, is the claim that feudal society in Latin 
America is actually a consequence of capitalist relations with Europe 
and the United States. Implicitly, Frank is laying the groundwork for 
the argument that the prosperity of the latifundia was the consequence 
of their capitalist relations. In other words, these plantations were 
dependent upon the maintenance of those relations. When they were 
broken, these plantations deteriorated. 
Frank is thus talking about the dependent development (overall 
underdevelopment) which occurs because of the integration of the un-
developed regions of the world into the world capitalist system of 
trade. What spurs on these capitalist relations between the developed 
and underdeveloped countries is the monopoly position capitalist multi-
national corporations are able to acquire in the latter. This condition 
of monopoly penetration, for Frank, has led to a great flow of surplus 
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value developed in Latin America to the metropoles of the United States 
and Europe, the complete opposite of what one would expect to find by 
following the arguments of Marx, Lenin, and Luxumberg. As Frank further 
points out, monopoly leads to "Close economic, political, social and 
cultural ties between each metropolis and its satellites, which results 
in the total integration of the farthest outpost and peasant into the 
system as a whole ..• , misuse and misdirection of available resources 
throughout the whole system and the metropolis-satellite chain," and 
finally, the "expropriation and appropriation" of the surplus value 
generated in the undeveloped states. 16 Thus dependence of the peripheral 
countries on the capitalist metropoles is reinforced, and the capitalist 
centers prosper. It should be noted that this dependence is further re-
inforced by the reliance of the underdeveloped countries on the 
developed for technology transfer. 
For purposes of limiting the review of the depentista tradition, 
Frank•s arguments will serve as a base on which the beliefs of his 
colleagues can be built, allowing ease of comparison and contrast. For 
example, James A. Caporaso clarifies the depentista argument by reason-
ing that dependency represents non-autonomous development possibilities, 
the lack of true independence from foreign or transnational influences, 
and the presence of a series of related domestic, external, and trans-
national characteristics. 17 These domestic and transnational features 
are often referred to as "structural distortions," describing the way a 
domestic economy is structured to meet the needs of the foreign sector. 18 
These structural distortions, according to Caporaso, manifest themselves 
in a lack of integration in the local economy due to linkages between 
the domestic and foreign economies, the marginal status of displaced 
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domestic groups left out of the development process due to the condition 
of dependency, and a severe gap growing between the elite and the masses 
of the dependent state. In particular, Caporaso emphasises the fact 
that dependency cannot be reduced to a "unidimensional concept," but 
must be related to a "syndrome of related concepts": external penetra-
tion, ties between local and foreign capital, and structural integration 
or disintegration of segments of the local economy. 19 Caporaso believes 
that American scholars over-emphasize the external dimension of depen-
dency (reliance on external markets, external sources of raw materials, 
and external infusions of technology), at the expense of understanding 
the domestic manifestations of economic dependency. In sum, Caporaso's 
concept of dependency requires that one view the dependent actor in 
relation to the entire environment in which it must exist; not just in 
relation to other states, but classes, other socio-economic groups, as 
well as political forces. 
Carlos Johnson also expands on the belief that Western (capitalist) 
theorists have taken dependency to be a form of underdevelopment rather 
than as an inter-relation between capital and labor. 20 This occurs, 
according to Johnson, not so much at the fault of the Western theorists, 
but because the depentistas have not examined this capital/labor re-
lationship themselves. In the dependency concept of Johnson's, dominant 
classes in the underdeveloped countries had appropriated huge sums of 
surplus value from the laboring classes, but as these nations gained 
full independence, this upper class could not preserve and expand this 
capital, and in fact, saw it siphoned off to the European and American 
metropoles. Thus, any chance for competitive capitalism was lost, and 
a situation of dependency resulted. In the light of this analysis, the 
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depentistas have come to argue that no influx of capital into the un-
developed states will result in the development of the nations of those 
_,. 
countries. (~Instead, they argue that Latin America is forever doomed to 
"""'· its dependent position in the capitalist mode of production. ) 
/ 
The depentistas have tried to answer several questions that have 
received increasing concern over the past few years. Why, as the 
developed nations have become richer, the undeveloped have become poorer? 
Why has development stagnated in many of the less developed countries? 
What part have the developed countries played in this stagnation? The 
answers provided, couched in Marxian terms and beliefs, lead to differ-
ent conclusions than those provided by Marx, Luxumberg, Hobson, and 
Lenin. 
The depentistas take the overall view that the underdeveloped 
countries do not progress when they are engaged in relationships with 
the developed capitalist states. They claim that though the capitalists 
of Europe and the United States do invest in the underdeveloped coun-
tries, the surplus value expropriated and removed from the developing 
states leaves those countries with a net loss. That surplus value is 
not reinvested domestically. The labor of these countries, which the 
capitalists acquire at a much cheaper rate than they could in the United 
States or Europe, produces value which is not reinvested for their bene-
fit. Hence, according to the depentistas, the underdeveloped countrie~ 
f 
I become poorer as the developed achieve a yet higher standard of living./ 
In summation, several trends can be identified with respect to the 
use of the terms imperialism, domination, and dependency in these eco-
nomic analyses. To generalize, imperialism is a relationship between 
two national powers of unequal strength, with attributes such as 
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population, native raw materials, strategic position, and military and 
economic capabilities determining strength. In this relationship, the 
stronger seeks to maximize its economic potential and wealth at the 
expense of the weaker. In order to facilitate this economic endeavor, 
the formal state apparatus may intervene so as to ease the goal of the 
capitalists. Thus, in good Marxian terms, the institutions of the 
superstructure (political, military, and even religious if one considers 
the areas of the world opened to European infiltration as a result of 
white man's burden" or "civilizing mission") all serve the mode of 
production. 
Dependency, on the other hand, has two rather related meanings. 
Classically, dependency refers to the reliance the underdeveloped coun-
tries have on the developed for investment, technology, and training. 
While Marx and Luxumberg saw Europe as seeking to maximize its own 
economic position, they did feel some development, though for selfish 
reasons, did occur in the less developed countries. On the other hand, 
the depentista's dependency is a drain on the underdeveloped nations, 
with surplus value being taken from those states at a much faster rate 
than it is being reinvested. Also, dependency is a domestic structural 
phenomenon, with the societal patterns being structured to serve the 
very mode of production which is draining those nations of their wealth 
and productive power. 
The Power-Security Theories of Dependence 
The other major body of theory seeking to explain strong-weak state 
relations and imperialism and dependency is the power-security theories. 
These revolve more around formal state-to-state interaction, and do not 
see the state apparatus as necessarily serving the economic sector of a 
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society. Instead, the term national security is commonly used to des-
cribe the goals of the stronger and weaker states as they interact with 
one another. National security, as the review of these theories will 
make obvious, is the general survival of a people to which a government 
is responsible (here, responsible need not refer to any democratic con-
cepts) and the territory on which they e~ist. The United States as well 
as the Soviet Union are equally responsible for the security and survival 
of their respective peoples. The notion of democracy plays no part in 
the fact that one of the chief roles played by government is that of 
guaranteeing the survival of their citizens. The security of the person 
is the basic goal offered by the power-security theories. 
The theories of several different authors will be examined so as to 
provide a general background of the power-security theories. E. M. 
Winslow, writing in 1948, said that explanations of the relations be-
tween strong and weak states cannot be restricted to economic variables, 
and argued that this would be an erroneous point of departure for the 
student and scholar. Charles Reynolds also rejects economic arguments 
for explaining imperialism, and then writes about how imperialism is a 
self-perpetuating phenomenon. Once again, the writings of James 
Caporaso will be introduced. Originally, he was identified with the 
depentistas; his work sought to reconcile some of the differences be-
tween those advocating an economic explanation, and those theorists 
advancing the power-security arguments of strong-weak state relations. 
Finally, a very recent book by the British scholar Michael Handel will 
be discussed. This new work, which is a comprehensive survey of the 
power-security theories, offers several points of interest to those 
interested in the relations between stronger and weaker powers. 
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Winslow, in his book The Pattern of Imperialism, acknowledged the 
economic interpretation of imperialism, but argued that it is incomplete 
and over simplistic. 21 He does note, however, that the logic advanced 
by the economic interpretations is compelling for several reasons. 
Modern man, "surrounded as he is with industrialization, money-making 
and aggressive business practices, all of whi·ch seem readily identifi-
able with capitalism ... , (has) reason to be impressed by these forces." 22 
The economic argument is easily invoked, deals with understandable 
factors, and "carries an air of sophistication which can be imparted 
with great educational faculty." 23 As Winslow points out, the economic 
h • • d • f II • t 1 II 24 t eor1sts prov1 e a v1ew o man wr1 arge. 
Winslow goes on to point out that several other factors have the 
ability to spark an imperialist foreign policy, a phenomenon he equates 
with militarism. These other inputs to the decision-making process in-
clude the love of adventure, the seeking of prestige (one remembers 
what drove Alchibiades to sack Melos), an enhancement of strategic posi-
tion, perhaps a dash of white man's burden, and the further expansion of 
ideology (both political and religious). All of these, of course, are 
not restricted to states whose systems are based upon capitalism. As 
Winslow attempts to show, a state based upon socialism can also practice 
a policy of imperialism. 
Imperialism and militarism are not restricted to any one state or 
economic system. All states seek prestige and advantage. Imperialism 
can occur within whatever economic system happens to be present, with 
that economic system being used to pursue and advance imperialist and 
militarist policies. Stronger states pursue imperialist policies 
because of an inherent fear for survival, with the term "stronger" 
leaving open numerous possibilities. Imagine three states all of un-
equal power. There are three possibilities for imperialist policies 
being pursued, with one state not even practicing imperialism. The 
point being, not only the most developed or strongest states have the 
capacity to follow imperialism. 
Charles Reynolds also finds the economic theories of imperialism 
too restrictive. 25 For Reynolds, "imperialism ... denotes a relationship 
of dominion," but not necessarily one of economic domination. 26 What 
generates an imperialist policy may be elusive to discover, but the 
drive for security and power may provide some insights. The power-
security thesis conceives the world as being composed of sovereign 
states, each responsible for its own security. This implies that each 
state must take the responsibility for its own security, that no single 
state can control all of the factors affecting its security. These un-
controllable inputs generate instability, which force a state to adopt 
imperialist policies. 
Reynolds goes on to suggest that this inherent instability and the 
imperialist policies adopted are self-perpetuating. As one state seeks 
to enhance its position among the others, it creates security problems 
for those other states. Thus, imperialist policies (often taking a 
militarist approach) are perpetuated, in turn heightening instability 
and insecurity. 
The power-security hypothesis postulates the pursuit of 
power as the primary objective of the state in its relations 
with other states. And this is supported by the creation of 
a war capacity, which in turn generates the reciprocity 
between states, making the need to provide security even 
more acute27 .... The only secure guarantee of territorial 
integrity lies in the exercise of authority beyond the 
nation-state through diplomacy backed by force.28 
In light of this analysis, both capitalist and socialist states pursue 
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policies of imperialism. In fact, it is quite easy to recognize how the 
competition between these two ideologies (as they have become personi-
fied by their advocates and detractors) perpetuate insecurity and 
imperialism on the part of the stronger countries. 
Returning to the writings of James Caporaso, who was earlier iden-
tified with depentista thought, clarification between the power-
security and the economic theses can be found, but from the point of 
view of the dominated state. Caporaso concedes that an economic inter-
pretation, with which he was earlier related, may only be one part of a 
larger whole. Dependency, or the economic analysis of being dependent, 
is a structural phenomenon largely divorced from conscious decision 
making. Thus, dependency is a part of dependence, a general term which 
describes the dominance of one actor over another. 
Here, Caporaso emphasizes the costs-benefits of dependence. A full 
specification of the structural conditions of dependence (termed 
"asymmetric interdependence") would include two actors A and 8: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The magnitude of A's interest in obtaining good X. 
How important is X to A? 
The extent to which X is controlled by B. 
To what extent does B supply X to A? 
The ability of A to substitute for good X ~r supplier B. 
What are the costs of substituting X or B? 9 
While in this context dependence is part structural, dependent itself 
upon the endurance of the asymmetric properties and continuance of 
these interactions, there is room for decision making; in dependency, 
choice is removed from the equation. 
In his recent theoretical work Weak States in the International 
System, Michael Handel examines the relationships carried on between 
states of various power. 30 In examining the relationships between 
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strong and weak powers, Handel identifies several factors that determine 
the strength of a state. This strength, in turn, determines a country•s 
proclivity to tieing dominant or dependent, imperial or the object of 
imperiGlism. 
First geographic data, which constitutes a "prime constant for 
survival," must be considered. 31 What sort of natural resources does a 
state have within its borders? What size of territory does a nation 
occupy? How many other states share common borders with the state in 
question, and are there any natural defense barriers along those 
boundries? Obviously, a diversity of minerals and natural resources is 
an advantage, but all states, those traditionally considered to be 
strong and those thought to be weak, are experiencing increasing vulner-
ability where natural resources are concerned. Thus, theoretical 
generalizations centered upon geographic information are increasingly 
difficult to make. 
However, the consideration of the geographic shape and position 
lends points of departure in the study of dependence. States with 
little territory are among the more vulnerable to complete invasion, as 
well as states which lack defensible boundries or share common borders 
with several neighboring states (due to the possibility of a belligerent 
coalition being formed). Such states, according to Handel, are more 
likely to seek an alliance with a stronger state in the hope of genera-
ting a deterent to potential aggressors. 
The military position of weak states is also of paramount impor-
tance when studying the question of dependence. Weak states attempting 
to create (at a minimum, when extra-territorial goals are not a con-
sideration) a credible deterent force are faced with a number of 
particular problems. Weak states often find that their small popula-
tions have difficulty in providing the necessary manpower to create a 
sufficient armed force, or when mobilized in times of emergency, lack 
reserves to deal with a possible war of attrition. 
The costs in national treasure are also a major inhibitor for a 
weak state attempting to enhance its deterent posture. The costs of 
modern weapons have risen, as is commonly know, to a point where many 
states have great difficulty in outfitting an armed force solely 
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through national means. Domestic production of weapons is a possibility, 
but because of the costs of research and development and running long 
production lines is often out of the question. This leads to real 
advantages for strong states attempting to exert influence over weaker 
states. "There is little doubt that the selling of weapons to weak 
states is one of the most important and perhaps one of the most effi-
cient means available to the (strong) powers in their struggle for 
hegemony. "32 
Finally, the economic position of weak states must be considered. 
For many of these states, domestic production is limited to a narrow 
range of goods. In fact, the weaker the state, the greater this con-
centration will generally be. These states also find themselves 
extremely vulnerable to external forces for consumer and capital goods. 
These factors contribute to Handel's thesis that for the weak 
states, the largest portion of their strength comes from external 
sources. Geographic position, military ill-preparedness, and economic 
vulnerability all force weak states to seek a patron or patrons. But, 
as Handel points out, no systematic study of these patron-client 
relationships has ever been made. 
This study, then, as mentioned earlier, will attempt such a syste-
matic inquiry of dependence across ideological lines. First, however, 
a working definition of dependence (subject to refinement throughout) 
must be advanced. 
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In arriving at a definition of dependence, several assumptions will 
be made based upon the work ?f the theorists already introduced. First 
conditions of imperialism and dependence emanate from both capitalism 
and socialism (this, of course, is one point to be tested). Further, 
in following the beliefs of Winslow, it will be assumed that both a 
socialist and capitalist system can be used to advance such policies if 
governments decide to pursue imperialism or allow their state to become 
dependent upon another. This is an important qualification because pure 
economic theorists might object to such a statement. As an example, 
socialists could logically argue that their doctrine dispels imperialism 
rather than promoting it. However, theoretical doctrine may seem quite 
different when that cannon is compared to how it is actually implemented 
by a government or society. 
For this study, then, dependence~~ asymmetric relationship~ 
which the costs of terminating the relationship are unacceptable to the 
weaker actor. Implicit are several ideas advanced by the above-
mentioned theorists: alternative suppliers of economic goods cannot be 
found, or the costs of substituting goods or supplier are too high; 
alternative suppliers of military hardware cannot be found at reasonable 
costs, either in terms of sophistication or numbers of weapons; and no 
other state is willing to commit itself in times of emergency when the 
actual survival of the weaker state if threatened. 
Some might object, saying that this definition of dependence is 
too broad or overly simplistic. Three points must be kept in mind be-
fore leveling such charges. First. this is a working definition. 
subject to change (perhaps even complete reconsideration) as examples 
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of strong-weak states relationships are studied. Secondly, this defini-
tion, as the first assumption stated, is broad enough to embrace 
relations between both capitalist and socialist states. Finally, it 
leaves open numerous combinations of states in this area of First, 
Second, Third, and now the so-called Fourth World countries. 
With this definition of dependence in hand, it will be necessary 
to test its accuracy and completeness. As mentioned, the examples of 
Cuba and Israel and their respective patrons. the Soviet Union and 
United States. will be used to test the proposed definition and 
generate a better understanding of strong-weak state interaction. 
The following chapter, then. will discuss how the concept of dependence 
has been tested in the past. and how this study will treat the subject. 
Once again. a systematic inquiry of dependence is the goal. with several 
germane factors and means of exploring those inputs being offered. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Before the dependent positions of Israel and Cuba and the resulting 
theoretical implications can be understood, a brief history of the 
empirical study of dependence is in order. Michael Handel is not 
entirely correct in writing that no systematic, empirical studies of 
dependence had ever been made. Several empirical studies, though per-
haps not entirely sufficient in methodology or results, have been made. 
Neil R. Richardson identifies several stages of development in the study 
of dependence, with the first being the simple measure of the "magnitude 
of each country•s combined economic and military aid from the United 
States.•• 1 While this served as the first step in applying systematic 
methods to the study of dependence, and has been employed by such 
eminent scholars as J. David Singer, it is extremely limited and perhaps 
misleading. First, the study of economic dependence must be differenti-
ated from that of military dependence if both are to be understood; 
only when each has been separately explored can they be rejoined in 
examining the dominant-dependent relationship. Secondly, dependence, 
as argued by the depentistas which will be discussed later, does not 
always rely upon the transmission of aid from one state to another. 
Also missing in this method of measuring dependence are two important 
factors: The exclusivity of the relationship (can the dependent state 
go elsewhere for aid), and an investigation of the dominate-dependent 
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relationship. 
The question of the exclusivity of the asymmetric relationship, in 
other words, the notion that a dependent state receives a relatively 
substantial share of its aid or trade from one dominant state, must be 
taken into account if greater definitional precision of dependence is 
to be achieved. If, for example, fifty percent of state A's Gross 
Domestic Production (GDP) comes from its export sector, then the health 
of that state's economy could be considered dependent upon its exports 
(a concept to be elaborated below). However, suppose that five states, 
B, C, D, E, and F each receive ten percent of A's exports; does an 
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asymmetric, dependent relationship exist? Indeed not. The stable 
functioning of A's economy is dependent upon its exports, but not upon 
its relationship with one other state. Suppose, on the other hand, that 
state B received thirty percent of A's exports, while C, D, E, and F 
each imported five percent. In this instance, one could argue (though 
complete empirical validation, as will be explained, is difficult to 
achieve) that state A is engaged in an asymmetric, dependent relation-
ship with B until it has the ability of domestically absorbing all or 
part of that thirty percent of its exports, or until it can find alter-
native importers. Hence, "other empirical investigators (came) to 
express dyadic economic flows as proportions of total external flows 
(from) the dependent economy." 2 
A third method used to measure dependence, one which Richardson 
correctly claims obfuscates rather than clarifies an understanding of 
the dependent relationship if taken alone, measures the dyadic trade 
flow as a proportion of the total GDP of the dependent state's total 
economy. 3 In short: 
where, 
TDAB = trade dependence of A on B 
= bilateral trade between A and B. 
exports of A to B. 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product of A A 
More specifically, 
What is being measured here is the proportion of A's economy which is 
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bound up in exports to B. While this is useful, it omits the factor of 
exclusivity, and thus the full impact of dependence of one state upon 
another. Richardson believes, and this study will employ the approach, 
that first the exclusivity of the relationship should be measured, and 
then the impact of the relationship on the economy of the dependent 
state should be calculated. 
A fourth method, one which will also be employed in this study, 
examines the "net external reliance," or the concept of asymmetry, of 
one state on another. 4 Here, the dependence (or lack thereof) of State 
Bon A will be measured by determining what portion of B's imports and 
exports are represented by trade with A. If a true asymmetric re-
lationship exists, then A's ratio (TAB I GDPA) should be larger than 
B's. It should be noted that a relative equality between the ratios 
would be more an expression of interdependence than an asymmetric 
dependence. 
At this juncture, it would serve clarification to enumerate those 
measurements of economic dependence that will be employed in this study. 
1. Exclusivity 
What portion of Cuba's and Israel's exports come 
from trade with the Soviet Union and United States, 
respectively? 
2. Impact of Trade 
What portion of the GOP's of Cuba and Israel are 
represented by trade with the Soviet Union and 
United States, respectively? 
3. Asymmetry 
What portion of the GOP's of the Soviet Union and 
United States are represented by trade with Cuba 
and Israel, respectively? 
Marshall Singer has offered several ideas to the understanding of 
economic dependence, a concept which he believes cannot truly be repre-
sented in any one index. 5 If, however, such an index could be devised, 
it would surely have to include, along with those factors taken from 
Richardson, several other indices. Those that will be used in this 
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study are the diversity of exports, diversity of customers for the major 
export (if such an export exists), and, taken from Richardson but used 
with greater precision, total foreign aid as a percentage of GOP. To 
extend the list of factors to be used in this study, then: 
4. Export Concentration 
What portion of Cuba's and Israel's GOP come from 
their chief export? 
5. Exclusivity of Chief Export 
What portion of that chief export is received by 
the Soviet Union and the United States, and thus, 
what percent of Cuba's and Israel's GOP is 
represented by exports of that chief export 
product to the USSR and US? 
6. Importance of Economic Aid 
What portion of Cuba's and Israel's total foreign 
aid comes from the Soviet Union and United States 
and what portion of their total GOPs does that 
aid represent? 
In concluding the economic analysis, the percentage of GOP earned 
through foreign trade will be added to that of the GOP received through 
foreign economic aid. This will provide a more complete picture of the 
dependence one state has upon another. 
At this point one could raise the objection that while several 
factors have been advanced which can surely demonstrate the extent of 
an asymmetric trade relationship between two states, to say one country 
is dependent upon another requires more specificity. This is where an 
empirical validation of dependence looses some strength. At what point 
is one country's economy dependent or not dependent upon another? If 
five percent of a state's GOP comes from exports to another? Or ten 
percent? Why not twenty percent? No adequate figures can be advanced 
which can be derived from empirical methods to determine dependence, 
but Marshall Singer has advanced several benchmark percentages (which 
Michael Handle, for one has accepted) that serve as points along a 
dependence-independence continuum. They are as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
If more than twenty percent of the GOP of a state is 
in foreign trade, then at least the monetized sector 
of that state's economy can be considered dependent 
upon foreign trade.6 
If more than one-third of that country's total trade 
is with just one Power ... , the decisions- public and 
private - made in the more powerful country that relate 
to the foreign trade of the weaker could have profound 
effect on the economic well-being of the weaker; and 
thus the weaker could legitimately be considered 
economically dependent upon the stronger.? · 
... any state that derives even ten percent of its GOP 
from trade with one country is tied to that power.8 
Further than just an empirical measurement of dependence, which 
implies a specific time frame to be analyzed, is that dependence has 
the quality of perpetuating itself. On the import side of dependence, 
in which the weaker state acquires large amounts of technology from the 
stronger, the dependent finds that it must rely on the dominant state 
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for training, spare parts, and expansion technologies. 9 Thus, depen-
dence is a difficult condition to break due to the dislocation and 
adjustment costs if exports to the dominant state are reduced without 
alternatives to absorb the production, and also because of the ties 
that develop from extremely close technological cooperation. 
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The two other inputs to be used in this study as mentioned in the 
introduction, regional isolation and military weakness, are included 
more for completeness in understanding these strong-weak state relation-
ships and may open new avenues for theoretical generalization. Of 
course, the assumption is that regional isolation and military weakness 
contribute to a sense of insecurity, and drive a weak state to seek a 
stronger country to provide a deterent to potential aggressors and to 
acquire the materials necessary to secure its own defense. 
Regional isolation, then, will be a rather easy factor to determine. 
A simple list of those that officially recognize Cuba and Israel will 
provide sufficient information to determine, within reasonable 
parameters, the condition of relations carried on by Cuba and Israel in 
their respective regions. Of course, the state of "behind the scenes" 
relationships, those that are carried on through other means than 
officially established channels, cannot be taken into account. A valid 
assessment of such interaction is simply beyond the scope of this 
paper. An outline of the officiality of state to state relations will 
suffice for this portion of the study. 
With regards to the military dimension of dependence, a summary of 
the arms imported by Cuba and Israel will provide the information 
necessary to expand the discussion of the relationships carried on with 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Included in this analysis will 
38 
be such items as the total military expenditures for Cuba and Israel, 
military expenditures as a percentage of each state 1 s GOP, total 
military imports, military imports as a percentage of each state 1 s GOP, 
and a list of each state 1 s chief military suppliers. This brief survey 
will enable the reader to get a better grasp of the dependent positions 
of Cuba and Israel. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CUBAN-SOVIET AND ISRAELI-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS 
Now that several of the theories attempting to explain strong-weak 
state interaction and dependence have been reviewed and a number of 
indices with the capacity of providing information on strong-weak state 
economic relations have been elaborated for use in this study, it is time 
to examine Israeli-American and Cuban-Soviet relations to better under-
stand such state-to-state interaction and how it can be measured. As 
pointed out in the conclusion of Chapter III, regional isolation and 
transfers of military equipment will also be examined to provide a 
fuller picture of these relationships. Economic interaction, then, 
will not be studied first; instead, regional isolation, by listing those 
states that officially recognize Cuba and Israel in their respective 
regions, will be studied first. This will provide a basis on which to 
understand why Israel and Cuba have sought extraregional trading partners 
and patrons to aid them with their national defence. After regional isola-
tion has been reviewed, the central concern of this paper, economic rela-
tions between stronger and weaker states, will be examined in.~the;cases of 
Israel, Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Finally, military 
transfers will be taken into account. 
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The Case of Cuba 
Regional Isolation 
The Organization of American States (OAS) took 
significant action at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation 
of Foreign Ministers last July. Its decision that member 
nations sever diplomatic or counsular relations with Cuba; 
suspend all direct and indirect trade with Cuba, except foodstuffs and medicines sent for humanitarian puposes; 
and suspend all sea transport with Cuba, except that of a humanitarian nature, has contributed substantially to 
the political and economic isolation of the Castro regime. All but one of the American Republics have complied1with the OAS decision- Mexico being the only exception. 
In our view, the principal reasons that Fidel Castro 
wants the embargo lifted are psychological and political. The psychological factor has to do with Castro•s intense pride: He seems to feel demeaned by the continuation of the 
embargo; he frequently speaks of the embargo as discriminatory, 
noting especially that the United States does not maintain 
an embargo against the two great Communist powers. The humiliating implication is that the US embargo is maintained 
against Cuba because Cuba is a small, unimportant power .... Politically, it stands to reason that Cuba would like to 
normalize economic relations with the2United States so as to be a bit less dependent on the USSR. 
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These two quotations summarize the regional position of Cuba in the 
inter-American system. After the fall of the Batista government in 
1959, the American states reacted with the conviction of stopping the 
further establishment of communist governments in the Western Hemi-
sphere. 
Actually, before the coming of Castro to power, the Organization 
of American States (OAS) had layed the groundwork for attempting to 
insulate the Western Hemisphere from the 11 international communist 
movement. 113 In the .. Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of 
' 
the Political Integrity of the American States Against International 
Communist Intervention," adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference 
on March 28, 1954, the OAS stated clearly that any state facilitating: 
to this Hemisphere the political system (communist) of an 
extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the 
sovereignty ar'l.d political independence of the American States, 
endangering the peace of America, and (very importantly) 
would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the 
adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.4 
In the "Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, 1954," the OAS left open the 
possibility for a wide range of actions in the event an American state 
should come under the control of a communist government with ties to 
an extracontinental communist state. The "Caracas Declaration of 
Solidarity, 1954," was adopted seventeen in favor, Mexico and Argentina 
abstaining, and Guatemala voting its dissent. 
In 1960, the "Declaration of San Jose" further stated the resolve 
of the OAS to resist the influence of the Soviet Union, the Peoples 
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Republic of China, or any other communist government in the Western Hemi-
sphere.5 While the document itself _declared that the members of the OAS 
were pledged to resist extracontinental pressures in the Hemisphere, 
the concluding statements added to the Declaration by the participating 
states, reflecting their opinions and reservations, are of particular 
interest. The Mexican delegation's statement, though reaffirming their 
country's belief that extracontinental influences and aggressions 
should be opposed, also declared that it viewed the resolution as "of 
a general character," and "that in no way is it a condemnation or 
threat against Cuba .... "6 On the other hand, the statement submitted 
by the delegation from Guatemala (only two concluding statements were 
added to the "Declaration of San Jose") related the feeling that 
II the American states would have been justified in assuming a 
stronger attitude ... 11 towards the government of Cuba for, 11 ••• adopting 
a policy inclined toward the Soviet Union and contrary to the inter-
Am . t 117 er1can sya em .... 
On January 22-31, 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs met within the OAS framework at Punta del 
Esta, Uruguay. At this meeting, the members of the OAS voted over-
whelmingly (twenty to one, with Cuba casting the dissenting vote) for a 
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set of resolutions restricting Cuba from participating in the inter-Amedcan 
system. In this document the members of the OAS explicitly said that the 
Castro government was 11 incompatible with the principles and objectives 
of the inter-American system. 118 Cuba was omitted from the Inter-American 
Defence Board, which was designed to coordinate the collective security 
arrangements under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
Suspended were shipments of all materials capable of being put to military 
purposes, with the OAS to look into the possibility of suspending shipments 
of other i terns. 
Finally, on July 21-26, 1964, a much stronger set of resolutions was 
adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 9 
By this time, the majority of the OAS members were satisfied that the 
government of Cuba had been actively trying to overthrow the government 
of Venezuela. The resolutions adopted were mentioned in the opening 
quotation to this discussion on the regional position of Cuba, but as a 
reminder, they were that all governments of the Americas sever diplomatic 
or counsular relations with Cuba, all American states were to suspend direct 
and indirect trade and all sea transportation with Cuba unless intended 
for humanitarian purposes, and to warn the government of Cuba that the 
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American states would use their powers, either singularly or collectively, 
to resist Cuban sponsered suversion; and to urge other states that were 
not members of the OAS to participate in the embargo of Cuba and sever 
relations with the island. 
One item of importance which has been omitted from this discussion 
of Cuban isolation is the Bay of Pigs invasion. The formulation of the 
invasion plan had started during the Eisenhower Administration, and was 
executed by the administration of President John Kennedy in April, 1961. 
As is well known, the invasion was a complete failure, with many explan-
ations being offered by officials and scholars for the fiasco. The 
point is that, though the focus of this study has been the regional 
isolation of Cuba, the effects of the Bay of Pigs can not be omitted. 
Up until the time of the attempted invasion, President Kennedy said that 
the United States could not accept a communist Cuba or Fidel Castro. 
The importance of the Bay of Pigs is that the Cuban government was shown 
in concrete terms that its own survival could be in jeopardy through even 
the force of arms. 10 
This problem for Cuba would arise once again in 1981. Castro perceived 
that the United States was preparing another invasion of Cuba; in fact, 
the governments of Mexico and Britian contacted Washington, inquiring as 
to the intentions of the US. Questions.arose with regards to American plans 
because of the rhetoric coming from the Reagan Administration. Especially 
strong was that of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who said that the 
United States would get to the source of problems in Latin America; it was 
assumed that he was referring to Cuba. Once again, the government of Cuba 
perceived that its security may be at risk, no doubt reinforcing a feeling 
of isolation. 11 
Source: 
TABLE I 
CUBAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
Name of Sta :e 
Argentir:3 
The Bahamas 2 
Barbados 2 
Canada 
Columbia 
Costa Rica3 
Dominica 2 
Ecuador 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Peru 
St. Lucia 2 
Suri name2 
Trinidad and Tobago2 
United States4 
Venezuela 
Type of Relationship1 
estab1ished 1973 
1974 
i.972 
prior to 1959 
re-established 1975 
19i7 
1980 
re-established 1979 
1979 
1972 
1972 
prior to 1959 
re-established 1979 
re-established 1974 
re-established 1972 
1979 
1979 
1972 
1977 
re-established 1974 
•. Unless othervli se r.o-ced, th~re is ar: en;b3ssv 'n o:acn of ~hese CO'Jntri es 2. Relations at the ambassaaorial le~el, but ambassa~or resides e!3ewher~ 3. Consular relations only 
4. Special Interests Sect;on 
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The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981. 
46 
While the vast majority of the OAS members complied with the 
resolutions adopted in 1964 (only Canada and Mexico did not sever relations), 
today all American states have relations at some level with Cuba, even 
if it is only a Special Interests Section. Table I provides a list of 
American states and at what level they carry on relations with Cuba, 
and when those relations were established. 
The Cuban Economy 
The study of the Cuban economy, as a reminder, will be based upon the 
indices explained in Chapter III. If Marshall Singer's benchmark figures 
concerning dependence are correct, then this examination will clearly 
demonstrate that the Republic of Cuba is dependent upon its export sector, 
that a position of dependence is further reinforced through a reliance 
on sugar exports, and that a state-to-state situation of dependence exists 
with the USSR due to the high amount of trade carried on with the Soviet 
Union. 
Cuba's dependence on its export sector is quite obvious. By examining 
Table II, it can be seen that from a low point in 1971 and 1972, when 
exports accounted for less than twenty percent of Cuba's GOP, exports 
have since risen to over thirty percent of the island's GOP. This would 
seem to indicate, but once again empirical specification is difficult, 
that the stability of the Cuban economy is dire~tly dependent upon its 
exports. A case of further Cuban dependence can be argued when the state's 
sugar exports are taken into account. As can be seen in Table II, Cuba's 
exports have never been comprised of less than seventy percent sugar. 
This of course strengthens any argument that the health of the Cuban economy 
is dependent upon the health of that country's export sector; this is 
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TABLE II 
THE CUBAN ECONm-W 
--------- -------- --·-----~-----------------Variable 1058 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
--------
-----------------
Gross Domestic P t'oducl 2140 4818 5544 5636 6154 6638 6576 6660 ( r4i 1 $US) 
Total Exports 742 805 840 1222 2669 2961 2284 2225 ( ~1i I $US) 
Exports as a ~~ of GOP 351~ 17% 15% 22% 43?G 45% 35~~ 33~.'. 
Suqar Exports as a % 79% 76% 74% 75% 86% 90% 87% 83"(, 
of Total Exports 
'}[, of Exports to: 
(Sugar) 
East Block 2"' 
'" 
65% 53% 6111. 54% 67% 76% 83% (4%) (59%) (55%) (63%) (61%) (70%) (71;(.) (7n%) 
USSR +2% 35:'1, 29% 41% 36% 561~ 61% 71';', (3%) (27%) ( 26~~) (35%) (35%) (55%) (53%) ( 617q 
East Germany 0?~ 5% 5% 4% 8:% 2% 3% 3~~ (0%) (0%) (6%) (5%) (3~;) (3%) (3o/.) ( 47;) 
Bulgaria 0% 3% 3"1 
" 
tl% 3% 3;~ 3% 37~-(0%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (3%) ( 41/.) (4%) 
1-!es tern 98% 35% 47% 36% <16% 33% 24% 1"'M I,, (96%) (41%) (45%) (37%) (39;!,) (39%) (?')%) ( 24"'.) 
Canada 2% 1 Of /0 11.~ 1% 3~ 2".' ,, 2?:. ]( ( 3;!.) ( 1%) (*1%) ( *1%) ( 2%) (3;!,) (3%) ( 2:::.) 
Japcln 6rf 
" 
12% 18'}[, 13% 1 ho/, 8"' /o 2')~ 1 ;,', (10%) (ln) (22%) (21%) (22%) ( 6%) ( 3~0 ( 3") 
Spain 2% 4% 5% 4"' 
" 
6% 8% 8% ·1 ),; (ttl wo (2%) (2%) ( 7%) ( 61:) ( 2%) ( J:l,) 
United States 67% 0% o•l ,o a~' ,, 0% 0% 0% f)<V 
" (59%) (0%) ( 0%). ( n;q (0%) (0%) ( O!;) ( (j•J;) 
----
----------------------------- ------
Sources: 
The Cuban Economy: ~Statistical Review, 1968-1976, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1976. 
The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, r-1arch, 1981. 
Cuba: Foreign Trade, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1975. 
especially so considering the large role played by sugar. Not only is 
Cuba dependent upon its export sector, given the fact that domestic 
consumption probably could not be increased to absorb such huge amounts 
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of sugar, but it is also dependent upon an agricultural crop which is 
itself dependent upon world demand, world price, and weather conditions. 
While this shows the impact of sugar on Cuba's economy, it does not answer 
the question of the exclusivity of those exports to one other state, thus 
leading to the proposition that Cuba is engaged in a dependent, dyadic 
relationship with the Soviet Union. 
The exclusivity of Cuba's exports, and the implicit question as 
to Cuba's existence in a dependent dyadic relationship with another state, 
can be answered by examining which states are the recipients of the majority 
of Cuba's exports. As can be seen in Table II, in 1958 over one-half of 
both of Cuba's total exports and sugar exports (once again, comprising 
over thirty percent of that state's GOP) were received by the Western 
countries, in particular the United States. Since the 1958-1959 Revo-
lution, the United States and other Western states have boycotted trade 
with Cuba to various degrees, and the 11 East Block11 countries have become 
the major recipients of Cuba's exports. As demonstrated in Table II, the 
Soviet Union has accounted for the majority of those exports received. In 
1958, the USSR imported less than two percent of all Cuban exports (three 
percent of its sugar exports), but by 1977 it was receiving well over 
one-half of that state's exports, both in total exports and sugar exports. 
This information can be used with more force to argue that Cuba's economy 
is dependent upon trade with the Soviet Union when it is realized that 
from 1973 to 1977, over ten percent of Cuba's GOP was represented by exports 
to the Soviet Union, and from 1975 to 1977, at least thirty percent of 
Cuba•s GOP was earned through Soviet importation of Cuban products (see 
Table III). 
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It can be assumed, then, that the Cuban economy is dependent upon 
its export sector for health and stability, and within this sector, sugar 
plays the dominant role. It can be further postulated that the Soviet 
Union, at least since the mid-1970s, has been the principal importer 
of Cuban products, giving in return a substantial portion of Cuba•s total 
GOP. The final missing factor, in fact the one question which will 
solidify any argument of dependence, is that of asymmetry. While for 
the Soviet Union it is difficult to determine what portion trade with Cuba 
comprises the total Soviet GOP, information is available that will allow 
an examination of Soviet imports and exports, and what portion of this 
trade is conducted with Cuba. As can be seen from Tables IV and V, trade 
with Cuba represents only a small portion of total Russian imports and 
exports. At no point from 1971 thru 1977 did exports to Cuba represent over 
five percent of total exports. On the import side, a low was reached in 
1972, when imports from Cuba represented less than two percent of total 
Russian imports. By 1977, this had reached six percent. Thus, as indicated 
from this information, Cuba .and the Soviet Union are engaged in an 
asymmetric relationship: the majority of Cuba•s exports are sent to the 
USSR, earning roughly one-third of that state•s GOP. For the Russians, 
on the other hand, trade with Cuba represents only a small portion of their 
total foreign trade and it would seem to follow that very little of its 
GOP is earned through trade with Cuba. 
From the evidence presented above, it would seem as though the 
Cuban-Soviet relationship meets Marshall Singer•s criteria for determining 
dependence. As Singer said, if at least twenty percent of a state•s GOP 
Country 
East 
USSR 1 
E. Germany 
Bulgaria 
West 
Canada 
Japan 
Spain 
United States 
* = l'ess than 
TABLE II I 
CUBAN EXPORTS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
1958 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
*1% 12% 8% c 16% 24% 36% 
*1% 6% 4% 10% 16% 30% 
0% *1% *1% *1% 1% 1% 
0% *1% *1% *1% *1% 1% 
34% 6% 7% 9% 21% 18% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% 1% 1% 
2% 2% 3% 3% 7% 4% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% 3% 4% 
23% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1. Includes Soviet export subsidies 
1976 1977 
38% 46% 
30% 39% 
1% 2% 
1% 1% 
12% 9% 
*1% *1% 
*1% *1% 
4% 4% 
0% 0% 
Source: The Cuban Economy: ~ Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of 
the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: 
Washington, DC, March, 1981. <.TI 
0 
Country 
USSR 
E. Germany 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Japan 
Spain 
United States 
* = less than 
Sources: 
TABLE IV 
U1PORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES FR0~1 CUBA AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL H1PORTS 
1958 1971 1972 1973 1974 
*1% 3% 2% 3% 4% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
NA 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1975 1976 1977 
4% 5% 6% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
0% 0% 0% 
The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981. 
1974 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. I, United Nations: New York, 1974 -
-- -
1977 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. I, United Nations: 
--New York, 1974. - --- -- -
U1 
1-' 
Country 
USSR 
E. Germany 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Japan 
France 
United States 
* = less than 
Sources: 
TABLE V 
EXPORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO CUBA AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS 
1958 1971 1972 1973 1974 
*1% 5% 5% 4% 5% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
NA 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1975 1976 1977 
5% 5% 5% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% 
0% 0% 0% 
The Cuban Economy: ~Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981. 
1974 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. I, United Nations: 
--New York, 1974. -
---
---
Cuba: Foreign Trade, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1975. 
U1 
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is in the form of foreign trade, then at least the monetized sector of 
that state's economy could be considered dependent upon foreign trade 
(for example, the need for foreign exchange and the ability to create 
a stable currency not subject to drastic fluctuations in value). Cuba 
meets this requirement. Further than this, more than one-third of Cuba's 
total foreign trade trade is exclusively with the USSR; according to Singer, 
the "weaker (Cuba) could legitimately be considered economically dependent 
upon the stronger (Soviet Union)." 12 As Singer pointed out, if more than 
one-third of a country's trade is with just one other state, then the 
decisions made in that stronger state effecting trade between the two 
powers could have a profound impact on the weaker. And finally, the 
Cuban-Soviet relationship matches Singer's third benchmark figure; from 
the 1973 thru 1977, Cuba earned at least ten percent of its GOP through 
exports to the USSR. According to Singer, this in effect ties the Cuban 
economy to that of the Soviet Union. 
Of a more descriptive nature, but as equally important to the under-
standing of Cuban dependence, are the various technologies the state of 
Cuba has imported from the Soviet Union. In 1979 it was pointed out by the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda, that with Russian aid, Cuba could eventually 
become one of the world's major suppliers of the mineral nickel. 13 In 
fact, Soviet aid to the Cuban nickel industry has been one of the major 
areas of cooperation between the two states. It has been reported that 
Cuba will eventually be producing roughly one-forth of the world's 
nickel. 14 
Also of importance to Cuba is Soviet aid in the field of electric 
power generation. From 1975 thru 1979, the Soviet Union helped Cuba with 
the construction of six power generating stations, with four more under 
construction. The largest of these plants, called "Maximo Gomes," is 
located near Havana; this faculty alone produces more electrical power 
than all of the power stations combined before the 1958 Revolution. In 
1979, another "Soviet-made turbine of 100-megawatt capacity" (one-forth 
of what the plant was already producing) was added to Maximo Gomes. 15 
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Also, as reported by the TASS news agency, the "Socialist countries render 
big assistance to the young Republic (Cuba) in training national person-
nel" to operate and maintain these power stations. 16 Topping the list 
of Soviet aid to the Cuban power industry has been the construction of a 
nuclear power plant. This plant is to become operational in 1985, and will 
produce 880,000 kilowatts of power. A second generating unit will be added 
after the first becomes operational. 17 The Soviet Union also helps Cuba 
with the construction of the power lines necessary to carry the generated 
electricity. 
Finally, though perhaps not of a direct benefit to the island of 
Cuba, but none-the-less representative of Cuba's technical and scientific 
dependence on the Soviet Union, has been Cuban participation in the Soviet 
space program. 18 On September 16, 1980, Cuban cosmonaut Arnalda Tamayo 
Mendez joined four Russian counterparts for a seven day space flight. 
The Cuban cosmonaut was trained in the Soviet Union at the Yuriy Gagarin 
Cosmonaut Training Center. The cosmonauts performed a series of biological 
and physiological experiments, and of particular benefit to Cuba was a 
series of experiments, using Cuban equipment, to explore saccharose, 
a sugar compound. As the Moscow Domestic Service reported, "Since sugar 
is the basis of the Cuban economy, these experiments are of great interest 
to Cuban scientists and will ... have a bearing on the production of sugar 
on earth. "19 
Type of Aid 
Sugar and Nickel 
Subsidies (Mil $US) 
Petroleum Subsidies (Mil $US) 
Total Subsidies 
Subsidies as a % 
of GOP 
Soviet Subsidies Plus 
Trade as a % of GOP 
Sources: 
TABLE VI 
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA AND 
RELATIONSHIP TO GOP 
1971 1972 1973 1974 
56 0 150 38 
0 0 0 369 
56 0 150 407 
3% 0% 3% 7% 
6% 4% 10% 16% 
1975 1976 1977 
611 995 1444 
290 362 328 
901 1357 1772 
14% 21% 27% 
30% 30% 39% 
Cuba: Foreign Trade, United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1975. 
The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1981. 
U1 
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56 
In terms of financial aid, Cuba received support from the USSR in the 
form of subsidies above the world market price when the Soviet Union 
purchased sugar and nickel from the island. In Table VI, it can be seen 
that from the years 1971 thru 1977, these subsidies ranged from zero to 
over one billion dollars. On the import side for Cuba, the USSR has extend-
ed to Cuba subsidies for the importation of oil. When these subsidies 
are added to the purchase price for sugar, nickel, and oil at world prices, 
it can be seen that the Soviet Union contributes almost forty percent of 
Cuba•s GDP. 
Cuban Military Imports 
The final portion of the analysis of Cuba will deal with that country's 
military imports, especially in understanding how much military hardware 
is imported from the Soviet Union. This will be accomplished in terms 
of several statistical indices for easy comparison to other states; in 
particular to this study, the example of Israel. These indices include: 
1. Military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
2. Military imports as a percentage of GDP. 
3. Military imports as a percentage of total military expenditures. 
4. Major military suppliers. 
5. Military imports as a percentage of total military expenditures. 
An examination of these factors should fill out the picture of Cuban-Soviet 
relations. 
As can be seen in Table VII, from 1971 thru 1975, Cuba•s military 
budget was four to six percent of that state•s GDP, with military imports 
representing roughly one percent of that GDP. A perusal of the data reveals 
Variable 
Tota 1 Mi 1 itary 
Expenditures (Mil $US) 
Military Expenditures 
as a % of GOP 
Total Military Imports 
(Mil $US) 
Military Imports as a 
% of GOP 
Military Imports as a 
%of Total Military 
Expenditures 
Major Suppliers, Cumulative 
1976-1980 (Mil $US) 
* = less than 
Source: 
TABLE VII 
CUBAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
AND MILITARY IMPORTS 
1971 1972 1973 
239 249 291 
5% 4% 5% 
30 70 70 
*1% 1% 1% 
12% 28% 24% 
Soviet Union .. 4300 
All others .... negligible 
1974 1975 1976 1977 
340 393 NA NA 
6% 6% NA NA 
60 70 130 100 
1% 1% 2% 2% 
18% 15% NA NA 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980, United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, March, 1983. 
U1 
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that the importation of military hardware ranged from twelve to twenty-
eight percent of total military expendatures. The best information 
available indicating Cuba's principal military suppliers is a cumulative 
figure for the years 1976-1980, which shows that the Soviet Union was 
Cuba's main supplier, with all other states registering zero or neglig-
ible military sales to Cuba. 
The Case of Israel 
Regional Isolation 
In some ways, the regional position of Israel is comparable to that 
of Cuba's, and in some ways it is very different. However, examining a 
table listing the countries of the Middle East and the level of relations 
carried on with Israel will give little real information about the situ-
ation of the latter in the region. Suffice it to say that only Egypt has 
had contacts with Israel to any large extent in formal diplomatic exchanges. 
Briefly, on May 14, 1948, the Jewish Agency Executive Committee 
declared that those parts of Palestine under Jewish control were to be 
considered an independent state. 20 The next day, Egypt, Transjordan, 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq sent forces into Palestine to take control of 
the Palestinian territories. It should be noted that the Armistice ending 
the war was negotiated with the Israelis having no face-to-face inter-
action with any Arab leaders. The talks that brought this round of fighting 
to an end were the Rhodes Proximity Talks, with United Nations mediator 
Dr. Ralph Bunche carrying messages between the delegations. 
Since 1948, various Arab states and Israel have clashed. Conflict 
broke out in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and between 1969 and 1970 Egypt 
and Israel engaged in a War of Attrition. These wars, coupled with the fact 
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that until 1977 no ~rab government sought formal relations with Israel; 
they kept the state of Israel completely isolated within the Middle East. 
Nineteen seventy-seven brought about a dramatic breakthrough with regards 
to Israel•s position of regional isolation by the Arab states. 
On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat flew to 
Jerusalem to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. This was 
followed by several conferences and the Camp David Summit in September, 
1978. Camp David, of course, produced two frameworks in which a Middle 
East peace was to be concluded: the first between Egypt and Israel, and 
the second a comprehensive regional peace. On March 26, 1979, with the 
further personal involvement of President Jimmy Carter, a peace treaty was 
signed between the two Middle Eastern powers on the lawn of the White 
House. Today, however, the relationship between Israel and Egypt is 
described as a cold peace, with little progress being made between the two 
countries. Also, no other Arab state has recognized the state of Israel, 
with a few Arab 1 eaders conUnui:ng to ca 11 for the fi na 1 des.tructi on of_ 
that state. 
The Israeli Economy 
This portion of the study of Israel will employ the same indices as 
used in the examination of Cuba. However, a review of the Israeli economy 
describes a somewhat different situation than that of Cuba. As will be 
elaborated below, Israel received the majority of its aid from one stronger 
power, the United States, but did not carry on a preponderant amount 
of trade with the US. As will be demonstrated, given any of the measure-
ments advanced by scholars or used in this study, it is extremely diffi-
cult to characterize the Israeli economy as dependent upon one other 
state. This is quite different from the situation of Cuba. A fuller 
discussion of the simularities and differences will await the end of 
this chapter, when such a discussion of any similarities will be made. 
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First, Israel does not experience an overall reliance on its export 
sector. By examining Table VIII, it can be seen that at no point from 
1975 thru 1980 did Israel's exports comprise more than thirty percent 
of that state's economy. The year 1980 was the exception to a general 
pattern of exports representing from fourteen to eighteen percent of 
Israel's GOP. An increase in the importance of exports to that state's 
GOP was experienced in 1980, but in that year there was an overall drop 
in the total Gross Domestic Product. 
Also, as elaborated in the theoretical review of dependence, if 
greater definitional precision is to be attained, then export concen-
tration must be taken into account. Israel is in the position of having 
a large portion of its exports concentrated in one broad catagory, precious 
and semi-precious stones, with a large percentage of these being in the 
form of cut industrial diamonds (see Table VIII). Israel imports the rough 
stones, processes them, and exports the resulting products. Israel also 
has other commodities that contribute to its exports: fruits and vege-
tables representing nine to fifteen percent, chemicals ten to fifteen 
percent, and clothing five percent. While Israel's exports of precious 
and semi-precious stones do represent from between twenty-nine and 
thirty-eight percent of its GOP, the country does have other exporting 
sectors which reduce dependence on any one sector. 
The question of the exclusivity of the importers of Israeli products 
also renders answers that do not support a case for Israeli dependence. 
Although Israel recieves the majority of its economic aid from the United 
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TABLE VIII 
THE ISRAELI ECONOMY 
---- ---- ---------------------------- ---------- ---------- ---
1975 1976 1977 
--- -·-·---- -·--- ------·---·---------
Gms~ Domestic P r·oJuc t 
(Mi I $US) 
Total Expor·ts 
( f•li 1 $US) 
Exporls as a·~- of GOP 
f1aJOt" Conunodities as a % 
of Total Exports 
Precious and Semi-
Preciou:; Stones 
Fruits and Vegetables 
Chemicals 
Clothing 
:(. of Exports to: 
Sources: 
United Sta i.es 
United Ki ngdo111 
France 
West Geru1any 
EEC 
13793 
1941 
14% 
33~ 
15% 
12r. 
5% 
16% 
9% 
6% 
8% 
39't 
15150 
2415 
16% 
33% 
13% 
11% 
51.: 
18% 
8% 
6% 
ar-
3G% 
16950 
3082 
18% 
36X 
11'(, 
5% 
19% 
7% 
5% 
9% 
37% 
1978 1979 1980 
---------------
27762 
3911 
14% 
10% 
10% 
4% 
18% 
7% 
5% 
9% 
:J5% 
33223 
4553 
14o/. 
31 ,, 
11% 
14~ 
5% 
17% 
91, 
5% 
10% 
39% 
21540 
f>543 
26?' 
29% 
9% 
15% 
5"' 
"' 
17% 
8% 
5/o 
10% 
40% 
----------
Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1982, International Monetary 
Fund. 
1978 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United 
Nations: New York, 1978. 
1981 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United 
--Nations: New York, 1981.-
1981 United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics, United 
--Nations: New York, 1981.-
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States (see Table IX), it is not carrying on trade with the US to an 
equal degree. While the majority of Israel's exports are received by the 
United States, at no point from 1975 thru 1980 did the amount reach twenty 
percent of all exports. The actual amount was between sixteen and nineteen 
percent. As a group of countries, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
received the greatest share of Israeli exports, with West Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and France topping the list. Israel's import schedule 
yields the same results. The majority of Israel's imports came from the 
United States, but in no way are they equal to the proportion of US aid 
recieved. The EEC, once again, was responsible for the greatest portion 
of Israel's imports. 
The one major piece of evidence that would indicate Israel's economic 
dependence would be the condition of asymmetry. As can be seen in Tables 
X and XI, Israel's exports comprised from between fourteen and twentysix 
percent of its entire GOP. However, for those states engaged in trade 
with Israel, the exports to and the imports from Israel comprise only a 
fraction of their total foreign trade; in fact, for no state, be it the 
US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, or France, does trade with Israel 
represent more than one percent of their total foreign trade. Also, as can 
be imagined, trade with the state of Israel represents less than one percent 
of their respective GDPs. But even this examination of asymmetry does not 
yield conclusive results with respect to Israeli economic dependence. 
While it would appear that an asymmetric relationship exists, and this was 
said to be an important factor in identifying a dependent relationship, 
this asymmetry must be considered with the inputs of trade exclusiveness 
in terms of partners and products. 
Finally, United .States economic aid recieved must be added to the 
Variable 
TABLE IX 
ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL AND 
RELATION TO GOP 
1975 1976 
Economic Aid to Israel (Mil $US) 501 678 (Aid as a % GOP) (4%) (4%) 
United States 437 617 
(3%) (4%) 
France 0 0 
(0%) (0%) 
~Jest Germany 63 59 
( *1%) (*1%) 
United Kingdom 0 0 
(0%) (0%) 
US Aid plus Trade as a % 4% 5% 
of GOP 
* = less than 
Sources: 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
836 1028 1319 1003 (5%) (4%) (4%) (5%) 
787 919 1246 830 (5%) (3%) (4%) (4%) 
0 0 0 0.2 
(0%) (0%) (0%) (*1%) 
48 80 54 137 (*1%) (*1%) (*1%) (*1%) 
0 0 0 0 (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
6% 4% 5% 5% 
Geooraphical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1976/1979, Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development:Washington, DC, 1980. 
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1978/1981, Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development:Washington, DC, 1982. m w 
Country 
United States 
United Kingdom 
France 
West Germany 
* = less than 
Source: 
TABLE X 
H1PORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES FROM ISRAEL 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
*1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% 
*1% *1% *1% *1% 
1979 1980 
*1% *1% 
*1% *1% 
*1% *1% 
*1% *1% 
1981 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations: New 
York, 1981. - --
0"\ 
..j:::;. 
TABLE XI 
EXPORTS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO ISRAEL AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS 
Country 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
United States *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
United Kingdom *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
France *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
West Germany *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% *1% 
* = less than 
Source: 
1981 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations: New 
York, 1981. --
0"1 
U1 
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trade conducted with the United States if Israeli-American economic 
relations are to be more fully understood. It should be pointed out that 
this discussion of US aid only refers to official aid, and does not 
include private donations made by American individuals and groups to 
Israel. When the percentage of GOP earned by trade with the US is added 
to the percentage of GOP received in American aid, it can be seen that 
official economic interaction with the United States has accounted for 
four to six percent of Israel•s total GOP. 
In concluding the economic analysis of the Israeli economy and in 
particular its export sector, one must return to the figures advanced 
by Singer as suggesting a condition of economic dependence. As for the 
first figure proposed by Singer, that if a state•s GOP is comprised of 
more than twenty percent exports then at least the monetized sector could 
be considered dependent, in only one year did the Israeli economy meet 
this condition. That was in 1980, when twenty-six percent of Israel•s GOP 
was in exports. In his second benchmark figure, that being if more than 
one-third of a state•s trade is conducted with only one other power 
then the former is vulnerable to decisions in the latter, no state claims 
one-third of Israel•s GOP or foreign trade. Even when exports to the US 
are added to aid received from the US, a case cannot be made that Israel is 
tied to the United States. 
Israeli Military Imports 
The state of Israel spends a great deal of its national treasure 
on its military establishment. In 1977, regardless of national wealth, 
Israel tied Iraq as the second leading arms importer in the world (Iran 
was the leading importer). ~s illustrated in Table XI, Israeli military 
Variable 
Total Military 
Expenditures (Mil $US) 
Military Expenditures 
as a % of GOP 
Total Military Imports 
(Mil $US) 
t~i 1 i tary Imports as a 
% of Total Military 
Expenditures 
TABLE XII 
ISRAELI MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
AND MILITARY U1PORTS 
1975 1976 1977 
3502 3761 3786 
25% 25% 22% 
725 975 1100 
21% 26% 29% 
Major Suppliers, cumulative United States ... 4300 
1976-1980 (Mil $US) United Kingdom .... 60 
Italy ............. 30 
Source: 
1978 1979 1980 
3409 4814 5051 
12% 14% 23% 
925 525 825 
27% 11% 16% 
_Worl~ lvJilitary Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980, United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, US Government Printing Office: Hashington, DC, ~1arch, 1983 
0'1 
....... 
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expenditures ranged from between twelve and twenty-five percent of its 
GOP. Of those military expenditures, the importation of military hard-
\'Jare represented between eleven and twenty-nine percent. According to the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the major supplier of arms to Israel 
was the United States, with the United Kingdom and Italy co_ntributing 
negligable amounts. 
Regional Isolation 
A Comparison of Cuban-Soviet and 
Israeli-American Relations 
Now that two representative cases of strong-weak state relationships 
have been examined in some detail, reviewing the regional positions 
of Cuba and Israel, and their economic relations with and military imports 
from the Soviet Union and the United States, comparisons between these 
two countries and the interaction carried on with the USSR and US 
must be made. Do similarities with regards to their regional positions 
exist ? What similarities and differences concerning their trade relations 
can be found ? What does a comparison of their military imports produce 
in the way of similarities ? 
In the question of regional isolation, .it can be seen that similarities 
existed between Israel and Cuba. Both states have found themselves 
isolated within their respective regions, conditions that the leaders of 
both countries have had to consider when formulating trade and security 
decisions. For Cuba, however, the condition of isolation has not been 
quite as critical as that of Israel's. In terms of total years, Israel 
has been politically and economically isolated for a much longer period 
of time than Cuba. Between 1972 and 1979, most states within the Americas 
re-established or established for the first time relations with Cuba. 
Israel has not been as fortunate in the Middle East. 
The differences between Israel and its Middle East neighbors are 
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of course at the heart of each state's regional positions. For Cuba, its 
isolation was one based primarily on political grounds. The governments 
of the Hemisphere feared fo.r their stability and the stability of 
important allies. The fall of the Batista government provided an examrle 
of the possible future fate of others. Also, this isolation was spurred 
on by the action of the Cuban government. While many reasons and just-
ifications have been advanced by politicians and theorists attempting to 
explain Cuban actions, the point is that Cuba was implicated in attempts 
to destabilize the government of Venezuala, and for sup:po.rting communist 
"fronts" in Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Haiti. 
It was of course the 1964 resolutions adopted by the Ninth Meeting of 
Consultation of Foreign Ministers that isolated Cuba within the region. 
A decade later, it would be the call for negotiation rather than confront-
ation, a belief on the part of some that Castro sought power and legit-
imacy through movements throughout the Third World, that would lead 
governments throughout the Western Hemisphere to recognize the communist 
government of Cuba. 
The question of recognizing Israel, for the Arab states, involves 
much more than political differences. The island of Cuba in a fact, regard-
less of which group of leaders or what type of government is in control; 
the problem is recognizing the legitimacy of those leaders and their 
government. The recognition of the state of Israel involves much more 
than an agreement to engage a government in negotiations; it requires 
an acknowledgement that Israel itself exists with geographically defined 
borders, as well as accepting its government as sovereign. The question 
for the Arab leaders is whether such a piece of territory even exists, 
or should exist. This is a fundamental difference in the positions of 
Israel and Cuba, and perhaps contributes to a greater sense of insec-
urity on the part of Israel. 
Economic Comparisons 
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Economically, great differences can be seen between the trade patterns 
of Israel and Cuba. In order to facilitate a comparative analysis of 
these two countries, comparisons will be based on the factors outlined 
in Chapter III. 
Impact of Trade. Once again, it is difficult to declare an empir-
ical value which reliably reflects when a state is dependent upon its 
exports, but Marshall Singer seems to believe that the financial sector 
of a state is dependent if it receives twenty percent of its GOP from 
exports. Whether or not one takes this figure into account, the import-
ance of exports to Cuba and Israel is quite different. It would appear 
as though exports are of much greater importance to Cuba than they are to 
Israel. 
The impact of trade with. the US and USSR on Israel and Cuba reflect 
differences that are equally startling. Cuban exports to the Soviet Union 
represented a considerable portion of that state•s GOP-- up to thirty-nine 
percent (including subsidies) by 1977. For Israel, exports to the United 
States accounted for only two to four percent of that country•s GOP. 
Export Concentration. An argument can be further suggested that 
Cuba is dependent upon its exports when one takes into account the degree 
to which the state•s economy is dependent upon its sugar exports. At no 
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point in the years studied did sugar comprise less than seventy percent 
of Cuba's exports. This is quite different from the composition of 
Israel's exports. While precious and semi-precious stones, principally 
rough diamonds imported from South Africa to be cut and then exported, 
command a substantial share of the products Israel ships abroad, that 
country has other items of importance. Fruits and vegetables as well as 
chemicals constitute over ten percent of Israel's exports, which produce 
more diversification and reduce the possibility of dependence on one 
product. 
Exclusivity. As generally is well known, though rarely put into 
concrete terms, the majority of Israel's exports are received by the 
United States; and the majority of Cuba's exports are shipped to the 
Soviet Union. However, once again there are great differences between the 
situations of Israel and Cuba. Israel is in the position of having more 
principal importers of its products than does Cuba, reducing the possibil-
ity of being affected by the decisions of American importers as compared 
to Cuba's vulnerability to Soviet decisions. Israel, in addition to 
exporting to the United States, sends large amounts of its products to 
the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. But Cuba is almost totally 
dependent on the Soviet Union for buying its exports. Even Soviet allies 
such as East Germany buy very little from Cuba. 
Economic Aid. For both Cuba and Israel, their primary trading partners 
are also their primary aid donors. From 1975 thru 1980, US economic aid 
to Israel consistently represented from_three_to five percent~of~tbe.latter~s 
GOP. For Cuba, Soviet aid played a much greater role, comprising up to 
twenty-seven percent of that state's GOP. This trend holds when the 
percentage of GDP earned in foreign trade is added to the percentage of 
GOP received in official economic aid. 
Military Relations 
When considering the question of military relations between the 
actors of these case studies, one finds that military expenditures as 
72 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product is much less for Cuba than for 
Israel. In fact, except in 1978 and 1979 when Israel was the recipient 
of large amounts of US military aid during the Camp David negotiations, 
military expenditures for Israel were more than twenty percent of its GOP. 
For Cuba, on the other hand, military expenitures were never more than 
six percent of the GOP. 
When considering the importation of military hardware, a similar 
picture evolves for both countries. For Cuba, military imports represented 
between twelve and twenty-eight percent of its military expenditures. 
For Israel, military imports represented from eleven to twenty-nine 
percent of total military expenditures. The difference comes when one 
remembers that as a portion of GOP, Israel spent much more on its military 
than Cuba. As a portion of GOP, Cuba•s military imports represented between 
one and two percent, while_Israel•s represented from two to six percent. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has focused on an examination of the dependent relation-
ships between states employing several hypotheses suggested by the 
literature. The first problem presented in this study of dependence 
is that of regional isolation. One would assume that the more isolated 
the state and the greater the threats to its security, the greater will 
be the possibility that state will be dependent upon a stronger state 
to help satisfy security concerns. This proclivity to be dependent can 
be observed by examining military expenditures as a percentage of total 
GOP, and the amount of national wealth spent on military imports from 
stronger states. It was found that Israel, which is more regionally 
isolated than tuba, spends a much larger percentage of its GOP on 
military preparedness, as well as spending more for military imports, 
with the United States being the main supplier. The less isolated state, 
Cuba, spends less on its military overall and less on military imports. 
This trend supports the generalization advanced by the security 
oriented theorists that the more isolated the state, the greater will be 
its dependence for security purposes. 
The second area of concern, and in fact the subject which has taken 
the greatest amount of space, is the economic dimension of dependence. 
Several factors were considered important to the concept of dependence. 
The first was the impact foreign trade had on the economies of Cuba and 
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Israel. The findings indicate that foreign trade is of a much greater 
importance to Cuba than it is to Israel. Secondly, export concentration, 
or the degree to which a state's exports are concentrated in one chief 
export, was of importance to the examination of dependence. It was 
found that once again, Cuba is more dependent than Israel in terms of 
export concentration. Cuba is extremely dependent upon its sugar 
exports, while Israel enjoys a diversity of exports. For a domestic 
economy, then, the more a state is dependent upon foreign trade, and 
the more a state's exports are concentrated in one chief export, the 
more dependent that state is upon its exports and its exports of that 
important product. However, such factors as the impact of foreign trade 
and the importance of one chief export suggest a hypothesis which does 
not take into account the dependent state's full relations with one 
stronger state. 
Other factors have been presented which elaborate a dependence of 
one state upon another. The first of these was the exclusivity of 
trade relations between a weaker and stronger state. Given the fact 
that a state exists in a position of being dependent upon its exports 
and/or exports of one chief commodity, the possibility arises that that 
state may be dependent upon a stronger state receiving the majority of 
those exports. As was observed, both Cuba and Israel carry on the 
majority of their trade with the Soviet Union and the United States. 
However, statistically at least, since Israel's economy is more diversi-
fied, it is not as dependent upon its exports, and has more trading 
partners, it would appear as though Israel is not as dependent as Cuba 
with respect to trade exclusivity. 
Another factor of importance to explaining a position of dependence 
78 
is that of trade asymmetry. This is a key indicator of dependence be-
cause for a case of trade dependence to exist, it is naturally assumed 
that one state is more reliant than the other; that for the weaker 
state trade between the two states must continue. It was found that 
for the United States and the Soviet Union, imports to and exports 
from Israel and Cuba were almost insignificant when taken in the context 
of their total imports and exports. 
Finally, economic aid was examined. This posed a much greater 
problem, however, because it is difficult to distinguish between aid in 
the forms of grants, loans, and subsidies, and aid in the form of tech-
nical assistance. In both instances, however, Cuba seemed to be the 
greater beneficiary. Cuba received large amounts of aid in the form of 
subsidies, and has received much help in the area of electrical power 
production and in the expansion of its nickel industry. If aid received 
from the United States and the Soviet Union is added to the proceeds 
from exports to these respective countries, a yet stronger case can be 
made that Cuba is more dependent upon the USSR than Israel is upon the 
us. 
An examination of these factors leads one to question the arguments 
of the Marxists and particularly the depentistas. According to their 
literature, stronger capitalist states so infiltrate a weaker state 
that the latter's entire domestic economy becomes structured by that 
stronger state, whether directly through pure investment decisions, or 
indirectly through repercussions from multinational (not specifically 
corporate) economic activity. The depentista view of dependency refers 
to the domestic makeup of a country, and not the reliance one state has 
on another. Industries are determined by the stronger state, along with 
79 
the unemployment rate and all other aspects of the weaker state's 
economy. Yet, it would seem that a portion of the depentista argument 
is flawed when considering the position of Cuba. Here, it would seem, 
a weaker state's economy is being largely structured by a larger 
socialist country. Cuban development is surely a non-autonomous devel-
opment. Indeed, the depentista literature is not being challenged on 
the concept of a weaker state's economy being structured by a stronger 
state's, but on its sole focus on relations between stronger capitalist 
states and weaker states. On the basis of this study the ideological 
orientation does not make that much difference. This will allow for 
more accurate theoretical generalizations, and at the same time reduce 
what would seem to be political posturing by some depentistas. 
The overarching concern of this study, of course, has been the 
comparison of dependence across ideological systems. Regrettably, of 
the various types of dependence described throughout this study, only 
one seems to apply to both Cuba and Israel, given the methodologies 
used. This dependence is that of regional isolation, in which the 
correlation indicated that the more isolated the state, and seemingly 
the more threatened, the more dependent that state is upon a stronger 
state for security concerns. Economically, the factor of trade 
asymmetry is the sole correlation found. Statistically, this does not 
prove a condition of dependence, but it does show that the trade carried 
on between the USSR and Cuba, and the US and Israel, is more important 
to the weaker states than it is to the stronger. As for the rest of 
the economic factors, Cuba seems to be much more dependent than Israel. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the refinement of Marshall 
Singer's framework for describing dependence may be in order. While 
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using the statistics he provides, a firm case of Israeli dependence 
could not be established. Both Israeli officials and citizens seem to 
perceive their state as being economically dependent upon the United 
States. It is believed by some that the United States has the power to 
exert its will over Israel in the event of a policy disagreement between 
the two: 
The increasing economic dependence on the United States 
could next year dangerously reduce Israel's political 
maneuvering space both in the international arena, as 
well in matters pertaining to the implementation of the 
peace treaty with Egypt .... Israeli elements have 
already estimated that military and economic aid would 
serve the US administration as a 'whip' for putting 
politifal pressure on Israel .... 1 
Labor Party leader Shimon Peres has declared in speeches that Israel had 
better move towards economic independence. He stated in one speech, 
"If we get accustomed to living on aid from others, we will lose our 
respect in our eyes as well as in the eyes of others." 2 The Israeli 
public is also conscious of this question of dependence upon the United 
States. In 1980, a public opinion poll taken in Israel showed that a 
large section of the population (38.2%) favored severing US aid, even 
if it meant reducing their standard of living. 3 And finally, even 
Israeli officials in positions of power have acknowledged Israeli 
dependence. In 1981, Finance Minister Yoram Aridor said to a reporter, 
"We are dependent on the United States because we require economic and 
military aid from the United States ... we must see reality for what it 
is."4 According to these statements, it would seem as though there 
are grounds on which to question the usefulness of Singer's benchmark 
figures (not the individual factors themselves). Perhaps future 
studies using a larger sampling of case studies will bring greater 
accuracy to his framework, and improve that elusive index of dependence. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V 
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in Hebrew, November 20, 1979, translated by the Federal Broad-
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2. 11 Peres Says Economic Independence Should Be Goal , 11 Jerusalem Domestic 
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